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FROM: GENDER & SEXUALITY LAW BLOG

COURT OF APPEALS
PROP 8 RULING
TREATING MARRIAGE AS A LICENSE,
NOT A SACRAMENT
Katherine Franke†

R

ainbow flags and corsages were waving high in front of the
Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village last night. There’s
much to celebrate about the 9th Circuit’s ruling issued yes1
terday confirming the lower court finding that Proposition 8 was
unconstitutional. As I noted yesterday2 and Nan Hunter pointed out
as well in her reading of the opinion,3 the reasoning used by the
court minimizes the likelihood that the Supreme Court will take it
up on appeal.
But what’s even more interesting about the opinion, now that
I’ve had overnight to think about it, is the degree to which the 9th
Circuit’s ruling amounts to a pretty definitive slap down of the
Boies and Olson strategy in litigating the case. Recall that one of the
main approaches taken at the trial by the so-called “dream team” was
to paint a picture of marriage as the most sacred, revered, mature
†
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form of adult coupling, thus denying access to marriage for samesex couples is a constitutional injury because of the fundamentalness and sacredness of marriage.
Instead, the reasoning used in Judge Stephen R. Reinhardt’s
opinion marks a triumph for the fabulous and smart Therese Stewart, the lawyer in the San Francisco City Attorney’s office who has
shined time and again in oral argument4 and in briefs filed in the
marriage equality litigation in California.
Judge Reinhardt chose Stewart’s argument, not that of Boies and
Olson, as the ground on which to base the affirmance of Judge
Walker’s lower court opinion. Indeed, he even said so explicitly on
page 33 of the opinion. Her argument was that the wrong of Proposition 8 lie in how “it singles out same-sex couples for unequal
treatment by taking away from them alone the right to marry, and
this action amounts to a distinct constitutional violation because the
Equal Protection Clause protects minority groups from being targeted for the deprivation of an existing right without a legitimate
reason.”
The case, in Stewart’s and the 9th Circuit’s view, turned on the
fact that Prop 8 withdrew from same-sex couples a right that California had already granted them. This creates a different constitutional injury than refusing to grant the right in the first place. In the
court’s words, the problem under this framing is “the targeted exclusion of a group of citizens from a right or benefit that they had
enjoyed on equal terms with all other citizens.”
The wisdom of this approach, to my mind, is that the
constitutional problem turns on the withdrawal of the
right, not on the sanctity or fundamental-ness of the right
withdrawn.
Reinhardt is clear about this: “The constitutional injury . . . has
little to do with the substance of the right or benefit from which a
group is excluded, and much to do with the act of exclusion itself.”
What’s wonderful about this approach is that it not only minimizes the likelihood of Supreme Court review, but it avoids the
4
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466

2 JOURNAL OF LAW (2 THE POST)

COURT OF APPEALS PROP 8 RULING

kind of sermonizing about the sanctity of the marital relation5 that
characterized Olson and Boies’ approach as well as that of a number
of courts that have addressed the marriage equality issue. The court
can find a constitutional problem with Prop 8 while remaining agnostic on the question of marriage and on the question of whether
the state should be in the marriage business at all. In this respect, the
9th Circuit and Stewart figure marriage as akin to any other state
licensing regime: you may not have a constitutional right to the license in the first place (such as a fishing license), but once you start
issuing the licenses you can’t then target a particular group, such as
catholics, Romanians, or gay people, and take away their right to
the license.
I’ve railed on in other places (here,6 here,7 and here8 for starters)
about the difference between the fundamental rights argument and
the “marriage as license” approach, clearly preferring the latter. I’m
thrilled that the 9th Circuit’s opinion in Perry has joined the less
moralistic side of the argument, rejecting the tactic taken by Boies
and Olson at trial.
Let’s hope that if and when the case is appealed, wiser minds let
Terry Stewart take the lead in framing the question on appeal. //
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